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FACTS
Respondents' ten page statement of facts indicates the extent to which the
parties differ in their view of the transactions and underscores genuine issues of material
fact remaining in dispute. In paragraph 4, Respondents state "Gate City suggested a
scheme" involving individual borrowers. In truth, Gate City merely informed Vaughn Cook
that it could not lend money to a corporation for permanent home financing and that the
only financing money available was to Fannie Mae qualified individual borrowers.
(Deposition of Stan Jenkins, p. 22, Appendix 6 Respondents1 Brief.)
In that same paragraph at page 3, Respondents assert there was a "prearrangement" among Gate City, Kilburn and Cook and the individual borrowers for
assumption of the loans.

Gate City denies any prearrangement or preapproval of

assumption. Gate City's loan officer, Stan Jenkins, clearly explained that if assumption
was desired, the assuming party would simply submit applications subject to approval by
Gate City. (Deposition of Stan Jenkins, p. 26.)
At page 10, paragraph 17, Respondents claim "each defendant continued to believe
and understand that he had been released from any and all obligations under the loan
documents". Gate City disputes whether Respondents held such a belief and whether such
a belief is reasonable, given the fact that the assumption documents were never executed
by Kilburn as Respondents anticipated (Record at 1009-1020 Appendix E Appellant's
Brief). This is especially true regarding two of the Borrowers who were attorneys and
who understood the requirements for release. Gate City asserts that such a subjective
belief is not a "fact" which could support summary judgment, but rather a "fact" which
is in dispute.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Neither of the requirements necessary to find that Respondents had been released
from their obligations under the promissory notes have been met. The ambiguous language
of the assumption agreements relied by Respondents does not meet the requirements of
1

either a waiver or an assumption. Certainly, the documents cannot be construed to meet
both requirements.

The language of the documents contain both patent and latent

ambiguities which preclude the court from interpreting them as a matter of law. Even
if the documents could be construed to be unambiguous, the intent of the parties, as
manifest by their actions and the other relevant documents executed contemporaneously
with the indemnity agreements raise issues of material fact which preclude summary
judgment. Therefore, the trial court's award of summary judgment must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE BORROWERS HAD BEEN RELEASED.
A. The Requirements Of Release Have Not Been Met.
Respondents (hereinafter"Borrowers") argue that the indemnity agreements satisfy
all of the requirements necessary to release them from their obligation to repay their
promissory notes. One need only review the requirements that must be satisfied to effect
a release to see that this argument must fail. In order for the Borrowers to be released
from their obligations under the promissory notes secured by the trust deeds which they
signed, the terms and conditions of paragraph 17 of such trust deeds (which terms are the
same as paragraph 10 of the promissory notes) must be fully complied with. That section
provides:
17. Transfer of the property; Assumption. If all or
any part of the property or an interest therein is sold or
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written
consent. . . Lender may, at Lender's option, declare all the
sums secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately due
and payable. Lender shall have waived such option to
accelerate if, prior to the sale or transfer, Lender and the
person to whom the Property is to be sold or transferred
reach agreement in writing that the credit of such person
is satisfactory to Lender and that the interest payable on
the sums secured by this Deed of Trust shall be at such
rate as Lender shall request. If Lender has waived the
option to accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if
Borrower's successor in interest has executed a written
assumption agreement accepted in writing by Lender, Lender
shall release borrower from all obligations under this Deed
of Trust and the Note.
2

In short, two conditions for release are imposed, first that there is a prior written
waiver of the right to accelerate, and second, that there tie a written assumption
agreement accepted in writing by Gate City. The first condition imposed by that section
is that the lender waive the option to accelerate. The trust deed clearly sets out the
steps to be taken for a waiver to occur:

1)

Lender and the person to whom the

property is to be sold or transferred reach agreement in writing that the credit of such
person is satisfactory to Lender; and 2) that the interest payable on the sums secured by
the deed of trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall request. Therefore, in order to
find a waiver there must be a written agreement entered into prior to the transfer which
recites that the credit of the transferee is satisfactory to the Lender and establishes the
agreed interest rate payable on the note as requested by the Lender.
The Borrowers allege that the indemnity agreements satisfy these conditions.
(Respondents1 Brief at p. 38.)

The deficiencies in this argument are obvious. The

indemnity agreements do not state that the credit of CC International is acceptable.
Vaughn Cook admits that neither he nor CC International applied to have their credit
approved (Second Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, R. 1005). He further states that he never
executed a document which meets the requirements of Section 17. Id.
As for the second requirement of a waiver, the indemnity agreements themselves
make no mention of the interest rate nor any reference to any document which would
set the interest rate or any other terms. The requirements of a prior written waiver
preclude Respondents1 argument that the waiver and the assumption were accomplished
by the same ambiguous language of the indemnity agreements. The Borrowers' assertion
that the indemnity agreements meet the specific requirements set forth for a written
waiver of the right to accelerate simply has no support in fact or logic.
The Borrowers claim that these deficiencies are "irrelevant" because Gate City
"demonstrated an intent to rely on the credit of Kilburn." (Respondents' Brief p. 41.)
How this supports the argument that there was a prior written approval of the credit of

3

CC International is not clear. What is clear is that Gate City merely informed Cook that
Kilburn would have to apply for assumption and that assumption was dependant upon
approval of the assuming party's credit. (Deposition of Stan Jenkins, p. 25; Appendix 6
Respondents' Brief.)
The loan commitment made to Cook does nothing to bolster the Borrowers'
argument that Gate City approved the credit of CC International. The loan commitment
was based on the loan of funds to individual Fannie Mae qualified buyers.

Id. No

"intent", let alone written consent, was shown to indicate that Gate City was relying on
the credit of any one but the individual Borrowers. Each Borrower went through the
loan application, loan underwriting and loan approval process. This included submitting
verifications of employment, deposit, income, credit, etc. Each Borrower was approved
based on the information submitted.

Each Borrower signed a promissory note and

executed a trust deed. Nothing in the loan commitment can be construed to be prior
written approval of the credit of CC International.
B. There Was No Waiver By Forbearance.
Recognizing the weakness of relying on the indemnity agreement as a "prior
written waiver", Borrowers attempt to argue that waiver was made by Gate City's
forbearance in exercising its right to accelerate. In support, Borrowers cite two cases.
The first PLC Landscape Const, v. Piccadilly Fish "N" Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502
P.2d 562, 563 (Utah 1972), does not deal with waiver but merely states that a party may
vary a written contract by a subsequent agreement so long as the subsequent agreement
does not violate the rule against parol evidence. Id. This case has no application since
prior approval is specifically required by the express language of paragraph 14.
Furthermore, there is no assertion of any "subsequent agreement" which waived the
specific requirements for release set forth in Paragraph 17 of the trust deeds.
The second case cited by Borrowers, Cooper v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 757 P.2d 483 (Utah App. 1988), also does not deal with waiver, but rather the
4

doctrine of laches. That case states that in the absence of a contractual provision
setting the time to exercise the option, the option to accelerate must rx? exercised in a
"reasonable time". The court stated that an election to accelerate a year or years in the
future could be considered reasonable under ordinary circumstances. Id. at 485. What
comprises a "reasonable time" depends upon the individual facts and circumstances of
each case and is therefore a question of fact which precludes granting summary
judgment. Id. Cooper holds that a party who does not exercise the right to accelerate
in a "reasonable time" is simply barred by the doctrine of laches from exercising it.
Cooper, 757 P.2d 485.
There are significant differences in the doctrines of waiver and laches that make
Cooper inapplicable to the instant case. Waiver is a conscious relinquishment of a known
right. Martin v. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 185, 61 P.2d 307 (1936). Whether or not there
has been a waiver is a question of fact. Bowery Sav. Bank v. Jenkins, 30 Utah 2d 232,
516 P.2d 178 (1973). Laches on the other hand is an equitable bar to the assertion of
a right. Olansen v. Texaco Inc., 587 P.2d 976, 985 (Okla. 1978). In Cooper, equity
demanded granting such a remedy. The borrower, in reliance on the lender's forbearance
in exercising its right to accelerate, reacquired the property and brought the note
current. Under such circumstances It would be inequitable to allow the lender to go
back and accelerate the full amount of the debt based on the prior transfer.

In the

instant case, the question is not whether equity would prevent Gate City from exercising
its right to accelerate, but whether Gate City voluntarily relinquished that right. Gate
City specifically agreed in the trust deed that in order to ielinquish its rights, a prior
written agreement was required. The doctrine of laches should not be confused with
waiver especially where waiver is defined by contract and carries with it legal consequences.

5

C. The Doctrine Of Ejusdem Generis Has No Application.
The Borrowers misapply the doctrine of ejusdem generis in an attempt to support
the argument that paragraph 11 of the trust deed does not apply to the right to
accelerate. Paragraph 11 specifically states that forbearance by the lender in exercising
its rights does not constitute a waiver of those rights.
11. Forbearance by lender not a waiver. Any
forbearance by lender in exercising any right or remedy
hereunder, or otherwise, afforded by applicable law, shall
not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any such
right or remedy.
Borrowers cite as supplemental authority Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336
P.2d 122 (1959). That case states the doctrine of ejusdem generis as follows:
In those instances where a particular enumeration is
followed by general terms, the latter will be understood as
limited in their scope to matters and things of the same
general kind or character as those specified in the particular enumeration, unless there is something to show a
contrary intent.
Parrish, 335 P.2d at 123 (emphasis added).

In paragraph 11 of the trust deed, the

general provision quoted above precedes a sentence containing more specific provisions.
Where, as here, the general provisions precede the specific provisions, rather than vice
versa, the doctrine cited to by the Borrowers simply has no application.
There is no "prior written waiver" of the right to accelerate as specifically
required by paragraph 17 of the trust deed.

The doctrine of laches should not be

confused with waiver especially here where waiver is defined by the contract and carries
with it legal consequences. The terms of the trust deed specifically prohibit a waiver
of the right to accelerate by forbearance. Given these facts, the trial court erred in
determining that the first requirement of paragraph 17 had been met. In the absence of
a waiver of the right to accelerate, the court need not reach the issue of whether the
indemnity agreements meet the second requirement necessary to find a release under
paragraph 17, i.e., a "written assumption agreement accepted in writing by Gate City."

6

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS.
The trial court erred in holding that the indemnity agreements were, "as a matter
of law, unambiguous assumption agreements. In reviewing the trial court's determination of a matter of law, this Court reviews for correctness and shows no deference to
the trial court's findings. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Hertford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App.
1989).
A document is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Kerr Land & Livestock, Inc. v. Giaus, 107 Idaho 757, 692 P.lid 1199 (Ct. App.
1984). Defendants cite Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773
P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) in supporl of thnr argument that the language of the indemnity
agreements is unambiguous. The language the court was called upon to interpret in Ron
Case reads as follows:
Panos, Bloomquist and Vesper, jointly and severally, agree
to pay all indebtedness which is presently outstanding or in
the future may arise which claims relate to the furnishing
of labor, materials, equipment, tools, fuel, supplies and
other items furnished to or incorporated into the Vesper
Projects.
Id. at 1385. That language clearly identifies the parties and the nature and extent of
the obligation. After a single reading, it is possible to clearly understand the obligations
created by the above language. That passage provides answers to all critical questions.
Contrast that language with the convoluted language at issue in this case.
Party of the First Part agrees upon demand to indemnify
Party of the Second Part for any loss (including but not
limited to amounts paid in discharge of the lien, expenses
of investigation, preparation for litigation, judgment, court
costs, and attorney's fees) it may sustain by reason of
omitting to set out such lien(s) as an exception in the
mortgage executed hereunder or by reason of enforcement
of this agreement. The obligation of the Party of the first
part in this agreement shall extend to the mortgage
executed by, through, or for the Party of the First Part of
assigns on the above premises.
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The trial court found that the clear and unambiguous meaning of the above
quoted language was that CC International agreed to take full, complete and sole
responsibility not for payment of mechanic's liens but for the repayment of 1.8 million
dollars in loans made to 21 different Borrowers.1 Appellant respectfully submits that the
trial court's construction of the indemnity agreements is so far removed from their clear
language that no one, layman, lawyer or judge, upon reading those documents without any
further explanation would reach the same interpretation as the trial court. Not only is
the meaning forced upon the indemnity agreements by the trial court not "clear and
unambiguous", the trial court's interpretation is not even suggested by the language of
the agreements themselves.

The more reasonable interpretation of the indemnity

agreements are to indemnify the lender, Gate City, for any mechanic's or materialmen's
liens which are omitted from the mortgage. Had the trial court found that such was the
meaning of the documents that conclusion would be understandable. At best, the above
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, therefore the language
is not "clear and unambiguous".

DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32

(1986). The trial court erred in so ruling and erred in granting summary judgment based
on that ruling.
III. EVEN IF THE LANGUAGE OF THE DOCUMENT WAS CLEAR
AND UNAMBIGUOUS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE
WHERE THERE
ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING THE
PARTIES1 INTENT IN ENTERING INTO THE AGREEMENT.
A. Documentary Evidence Is Not Dispositive If The Intent And Purpose Underlying The
Documents Are At Issue.
It is strange that the parties claiming that the indemnity agreements are "clear
and unambiguous" are not parties to the agreement.

The parties to the indemnity

agreements, CC International and Gate City, clearly expressed, through affidavits
submitted to the trial court, that they did not understand or intend the indemnity

*The entire amount of the transaction was 2.2 million dollars, however, two of the
Borrowers did not join in the motion.
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agreements to be construed as assumptions. (Second Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, f 8;
Appendix E Appellant's Brief; Affidavit of Blaze Johnson; Record at 575, 829, 958.)
The trial court erred in ignoring evidence of the parties' intent, even if the
indemnity agreements seemed clear and unambiguous. W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). (See, Appellant's Brief, Point III.) In the
instant case, the central issue facing the trial court was the intent of the parties in
executing the indemnity agreements. The affidavits of Vaughn Cook submitted to the
trial court create questions of fact regarding the intent of CC International. The second
affidavit of Vaughn Cook states that
. . . neither I, nor my company, CC International, Inc., ever
applied to Gate City Mortgage Company to have our credit
approved in connection with assuming the subject mortgage
loan obligations, nor did we execute a writing whereby
Gate City Mortgage Company approved our credit as an
assuming party or fixed the interest rate to be charged, nor
did we ever execute a writing to assume such obligations
or otherwise agree or consent thereto, nor did we intend
or understand that the defendants would be released from
liability thereby.
(Second Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, H 8; Record at 1005; Appendix E Appellant's Brief.)
The third affidavit of Vaughn Cook states:
It is true that at the time I signed those indemnity
agreements, I did not realize that those instruments, by
themselves, manifested an agreement by CC International
to assume the obligations of the mortgage loans.
(Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, H 15; Appendix No. 1 Respondents1 Brief.) A party's
intent must be determined as of the time of the transaction.

Hefley Ranch, Inc. v.

Stewart, 764 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1988). The statement In Cook's third affidavit that
he would have "intended to assume . . . if only for a interim period" was not a statement
of his intent at the ti me the transaction was entered into. He clearly stated that at the
time that the transaction was entered into, he did not .have the understanding that he
was assuming the Borrowers' liability. (Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, f 16.) Cook
admits that he never applied for assumption of the loans and never signed any documents
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to effect an assumption. The statement in Cook's third affidavit stating in retrospect
what he "would have done" demonstrates not only that he did not have the intention of
assuming the loans when signing the documents but also demonstrates that the indemnity
agreements were so ambiguous that he did not understand them to have had that effect.
If the tables were turned and Gate City was suing Cook claiming that he assumed 1.8
million dollars in loans by signing the indemnity agreements, clearly his affidavit would
raise a question of fact regarding his intent which would preclude summary judgment
against him.

The result should be consistent where, as here, Gate City raised the

question of fact regarding his intent in entering into the indemnity agreements.
B. Respondent's Argument That All Parties Knew That Assumptions Were Intended Is
Misplaced.
Respondents1 argument that they anticipated an assumption cuts against their
position. It is clear from the facts presented to the trial court that they understood
that Kilburn Vacation Home Share not CC International was to make application to
assume the loans. The Borrowers all expected Kilburn to assume the loans and executed
assumption agreements for it to do so. (Appendix E Appellant's Brief; see also, Point
IV.B., page 29 Appellant's Brief.) Cook stated that Kilburn was to assume the loans.
(Deposition of Vaughn Cook, p. 300; Record at 1087.) Jenkins was told that Kilburn was
going to apply for assumption.

(Deposition of Stan Jenkins at p. 24; Appendix 6

Respondents' Brief.) Jim Clark, on behalf of Kilburn Vacation Home Share, stated that
Kilburn would attempt to assume the loans. (Affidavit of Jim Clark, H 3; Appendix No.
5 Respondents' Brief.) The undisputed fact is that despite any expectations, promises or
commitments to the contrary, Kilburn never assumed the loans. (Respondents' Brief at
32.) The court did not find that Kilburn assumed the loans, therefore, Respondents'
"understanding" of how the loans were to be assumed is contrary to the position now
taken by Respondents that CC International assumed the loans.

10

C. The Affidavit Of Blaze Johnson Contains Competent Evidence.
The affidavit of Blaze Johnson2 is more than "unsubstantiated opinion" as asserted
by Respondents. In Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985), cited by the respondents, the court reversed summary judgment and found that an affidavit of plaintiff's
architect created issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment. The court
so found despite the fact that the architect did not design the house in question, but
merely made observations and offered opinions based on those observations.

The

affidavit of Mr. Johnson established that to accomplish an assumption Gate City would
use proper forms and follow the requirements of its trust deed. Mr. Johnson has personal
knowledge of those facts which were material to the determination of the question
before the court. Based on those facts, Mr. Johnson makes comparison of the transaction
in question with the accepted procedures and practices of Gate City.

Adequate

foundation is laid for each of the facts and observations drawn. Therefore, the affidavit
is competent evidence and creates a question of fact regarding the meaning of Gate
City's forms and its intent in executing the indemnity agreements in question.
D. Questions Of Fact Are Raised By The Other Relevant Documents.
In section IV of their brief, the Borrowers admit that the uniform real estate
contracts executed by Vaughn Cook state that the properties were taken "subject to" the
mortgage.

Those real estate contracts were to be "fully paid" when a complete

assumption of Respondents' liability was made. (Deposition of Vaughn Cook, p. 300;
Record at 1037.)

Respondents at page 33 of their brief assert that the indemnity

agreements "fulfill this contractual obligation of CC International to defendants." This
conclusion cannot be true for several reasons. First, the indemnity agreements were
entered prior to the real estate contracts and therefore could not be in satisfaction of
the conditions stated therein. Second, Cook did not do any act necessary to satisfy the

2

A copy of the affidavit is attached hereto as Appendix "A".
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requirements of a release under paragraph 17 of the trust deed. (Second Affidavit of
Vaughn Cook, H 8.) Third, the contracts were not treated as satisfied but remained in
escrow at Alta Title. (Deposition of Vaughn Cook, p. 300; Record at 1087.) Fourth, any
assumption by Cook would have at most been a simple or "interim assumption". (Third
Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, H 15.) Fifth, Kilburn was to apply for and obtain a complete
formal assumption and release. (Affidavit of Jim Clark, H 3; Record at 1432.)
The intent of the parties to the transactions is placed squarely at issue in this
case. Their conduct and the other relevant documents clearly create questions of fact
regarding their intent. Therefore, even if the documents were deemed "unambiguous",
the questions of fact surrounding the intent of Gate City and CC International in
entering into the indemnity agreements preclude summary judgment as a matter of law.
IV. APPELLANT DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN
OF CONVINCING THE COURT OF ANY ALTERNATIVE
INTERPRETATION OF THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS.
At page 18 of their Brief, Borrowers inaccurately state that Appellant had not
discussed the language in the beginning of each indemnity agreement which states that
CC International had obtained a mortgage. Appellant refers the Court to pages 16 and
17 of its Brief which points out that this language created a latent ambiguity in the
document since it is undisputed that no mortgage loans were made to CC International.
The Borrowers would have the Court draw an inference from this obviously
inaccurate language to support their construction of the indemnity agreements. However,
on viewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all facts and all
inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the party resisting the
motion. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Heriford, 772 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1989). Viewing
the inaccurate language in the indemnity agreements in the light most favorable to Gate
City, the language creates ambiguity in the documents which would preclude summary
judgment. See, Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1980).
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The "questions" posed by Borrowers on pages 19 and 20 of their brief are typical
of the genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment. Respondents
seem to suggest that Appellant must prove some alternative interpretation of the
indemnity agreements in order to prevail. In order to avoid summary judgment, Appellant
need only demonstrate that an ambiguity exists. Kerr Land and Livestock v. Glaus, 692
P.2d 1199 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984).
There are numerous "reasonable explanations" which address the questions listed
by Borrowers at pages 19 and 20 of their brief. It is not Appellant's burden in avoiding
summary judgment to prove any of the "reasonable explanations" of the language of the
indemnity agreements. It was and is Borrowers' burden to show there is only one "clear
and unambiguous" interpretation of the indemnity agreements and to establish that there
were no questions of fact regarding that interpretation.
The question posed by the Borrowers at pages 19 and 20 of their Brief can be
easily answered consistent with other "reasonable interpretations" of the indemnity
agreements.
1.
request.

CC International signed the indemnity agreements at Gate City's
(Third Affidavit of Vaughn Cook, fl 12 R. 1052.)

It was willing to

accommodate Gate City's desire to be protected from mechanic's liens to protect
its own interest in making sure this deal went through. If the loans were not
made Vaughn Cook, principal of CC International, stood to lose a great deal of
money.
2. CC International was not the obligor on the notes and may have been
described as having "obtained" a mortgage from Gate City in a misguided attempt
to show consideration for its promise to indemnify against mechanic's liens. This
is consistent with the language used later in the document which states the
mortgages were executed "by, for or on behalf of CC International."

This

language reflects not that CC International was liable on the loans, but that CC
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International has an interest in the transaction which could serve as consideration for its promise to indemnify.
3. Either party, Gate City or CC International may have wished to omit
the liens from the recorded security interest to make the loans and the
properties easier to transfer.
4. CC International was willing to indemnify against materialmen's liens
because as the builder it was already obligated to pay those who provided
material and labor. It neither increased its obligation or risk by agreeing to
indemnity Gate City against such liens. It also anticipated immediate income
from the sale of the homes which would allow it to pay the material providers
and release any liens.
5. CC International stood to "benefit in the conduct of its business" by
selling the homes to the Borrowers and then repurchasing the homes, with
permanent financing in place and reselling them to Kilburn Vacation Home Share.
6. The language that CC International's obligation to indemnify extends
to this mortgage should at best be interpreted as making it a surety not a
principal obligor.
7. The language that the mortgages were executed by, for or on behalf
of CC International, while not technically correct, accurately reflects Cook's
view of the transaction since each of the Borrowers entered into the transaction
on Cook's inducement and request.
While Appellant does not bear the burden of proving any "reasonable interpretation" of the indemnity agreement, the fact that the questions posed by Borrowers can be
answered based on Appellant's view of the facts clearly shows that the indemnity
agreements are subject to reasonable interpretations which conflict with the trial court's
reading of the indemnity agreements.

Therefore, the documents are ambiguous and

14

summary judgment is inappropriate as a matter of law. W.M. Barnes v. Sohio Natural
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).
V. RESPONDENTS BEAR THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Respondents argue in Section VI of their brief that Gate City had the obligation
to come forward with a submission to place in issue the fact that the indemnity
agreements were not submitted for each of the moving parties. In support they cite
Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983). That case states "where the
moving party's evidentiary material is itself sufficient, and the opposing party fails to
offer any evidentiary matters when it is in a position to do so. . . ." In the instant case,
the moving party's evidentiary material is not sufficient.

Borrowers claim that the

indemnity agreement is a complete assumption and claimed that all movants are released
even though they cannot produce the critical documents for two of the transactions.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving parties have the burden of establishing
the facts which entitle them to relief. See, FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co.,
594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). Here, Borrowers have failed to meet that burden. Gate City
is not in a position to submit an affidavit as to the non-existence of a fact. Appellant
simply argued to the trial court as it does here that appellant does not have those
documents in its files. The non-existence of the documents in the files of Gate City
where they would normally be found creates a reasonable inference that the documents
do not exist. It is incumbent upon the Borrowers as moving parties to produce such
documents. Borrowers simply could not produce the documents. The affidavit of Vaughn
Cook may create an inference that the documents exist, however, to make a determination between two conflicting inferences is not proper on a motion for summary judgment.
See, Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982).
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CONCLUSION
In order to rule as it did, the trial court had to determine that the requirements
of paragraph 17 of the trust deed had been met. The first requirement, a written waiver
of the right to accelerate, has never been met.

Unless this Court finds that this

condition is met, it need not determine whether the trial court was correct in ruling that
the indemnity agreements constituted clear and unambiguous agreements by CC International to assume complete and full responsibility for payment of promissory notes signed
by the Borrowers.
With regard to this second requirement, the language of the indemnity agreement
contain patent and latent ambiguities. The intent of the parties in signing the indemnity
agreements was clearly placed at issue. The conflicting affidavits of the parties and the
other relevant documents submitted to the trial court all create questions of fact
regarding Gate City and CC International's intent in entering into the indemnity
agreements. These questions of fact may not be determined on a motion for summary
judgment, therefore the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of February, 1990.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS

K

—CtARK W. SESSIONS

^Vv' _. - -

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the 26th day of February, 1990, I caused to be hand
delivered four true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the
following:
Earl J. Peck, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
Douglas K. Pehrson, Esq.
Jay R. Mohlman, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
ROY B. MOORE (2308)
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON (099)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF
BLAISE P. JOHNSON

vs.
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C.
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C.
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM,
et al.,
Defendants.
EDWARD A. DALTON, JR., JOHN C.
FORRESTER, JR., MICHAEL C.
JOHNSEN, and DANIEL W. MARCUM,
et al.,
Counterclaimants,
v.
GATE CITY FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION,
Counterclaim Defendant.

Consolidated Case No. 8074
(8075)
(8076)
(8077)
(8078)
(8079)
(8080)
(8081)
(8082)
(8119)
(8120)

STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA)
: SS.

COUNTY OF CASS

)

I, Blaise P. Johnson, being first duly sworn state as
follows:
1.

I am an officer of Gate City Mortgage Company.

2.

The Indemnity Agreement form attached is a standard,

pre-printed form, used by Gate City Mortgage Company to obtain
indemnification on mechanics and/or materialmens liens.
3.

As of the date of each of the Indemnity Agreements

involving the subject Jeremy Ranch properties, no mortgage loans
had been made to C.C. International or Vaughn Cook by Gate City
Mortgage Company.
4.

The Indemnity Agreements covering the subject Jeremy

Ranch properties do not reflect that C.C. International or Vaughn
Cook had, or was thereby, assuming the obligation on the Jeremy
Ranch

mortgage

loans

made

to

the

Defendants

in

the

above-captioned matter, secured by the subject Jeremy Ranch
property.
5.

As of the date of the execution of each of the Indemni-

ty Agreements covering the subject Jeremy Ranch properties,
neither C.C. International nor Vaughn Cook had^ae* applied for
assumption of the subject Jeremy Ranch mortgage loans.
6.

Standard forms are used to accomplish an assumption.

These forms clearly state whether or not the original borrower is
released from liability on the loan.

(see Exhibit "B" attached).

7.

The Indemnity Agreement form is not used to evidence an

assumption.

It is used simply to insure that the indemnitor,

here C.C. International, would indemnify Gate City for mechanics
or materialmens liens on the properties.
DATED

3rd day of February, 1989.

BLAISE P. JOHNSON \J
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3rd day of February,
1989
-.

\

•

XNOTARY PUBLIC
Residing

My Commission E x p i r e s

SANDRA H. BERGOUISi
Hotary Public, STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
My Commission Expires juwe 2
m

at;

West Fargo, North Dakota

INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 3

•\

•i

• •::?.• '-.ill '•' •»•

-A

l"\

81 i andTHIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into ti,k 30th d .fy ot ' -feeceffifcfer
'i9JLL<by
between .
'^hereinafter
referred
to
an
Party
of the
-C. C. I n t c r o a t i o n a J First Part and Gate C i t y Mortqaqe Company,' h e r e i n a f t e r referred;"to *ac J .Party ; bf t h e •'
Second P a r t .

,'

,.

•"'•'••

;

'

>' •

'.'••

'•;.

• ••;'•}.

WITNESSETH-

.-.'J. ? ,

:

£'

•'

4

;

;>

f )

"§

• .

'

',

'•';•

•; '

)':Xy"
•

;

•

'• ;:. .
•

-

•

••'•'-

WHEREAS, Party of the First; Part has obtained from the Party'gfljtho Second Part
.-) f i r s t mortgage loan for the p r i n c i p a l - b a l a n c e ' o f $200,000.00 on the following
described property:;
•[
. .
^
.">•• : . > . ; • • . *
. )
.. j .
?.;
:
•'.
•
f. • V
>'-. ' ;'v •
''
.'*...:
•'
.-j '
-I •
All of Lot 48, The Jeremy Ranch"'Plat No.'.l," according to the.official plat
thereof, recorded in the. office of the Summit Qounty .Recorder. *:; . X'' '
Subject to and together with a right of way for the purpose of ingress and
egress over those roadways as designated on the official pla£ of Jeremy Ranch
Plat No.' 1, as recorded in-the Summit County Recorders office, as Entry No.
157211/
••.'•'.
...,•••
; •;
>v
. '
\ "> -%
Situate in Summit County, State of Utah.

^

•:

*.

>

•

.

.:

.

.

*

• .••;• • • • • : . > " .

'••.

' • • < - . •

• •

'*•.

*-, '
?

• * • ! « -

•?••,-

•

I- •

»•
:

*-

\

•r
T

• • ' . . .

f,

"•" Y
;

'

• • ?
!

*

• '

•

•
'
' £ •-•••;>
*
•••'-•
r & ' -' ' 3' • : "• )...
(
~<\
and such property is now subject to mechanic*' and/or .materialmen's liens insofar a.s the-time for filing *
the same is concerned and it is the desire of the Party of the First Part that such mortgage shiill bci
executed without shpwinq therein an exception for such possible l i e n s , and the"P;irty of
the Second Part i s hot agreeable thereto u n l e s s the Party of the r'ir:;t Part shall
guarantee the.discharge of such l i e n s . •:•
•
.
:
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the additional liability Party of the
Second Part will sustairfby reason of omitting to state, as an exception in such mortqnqe t h e i n t e r e s t o
mechanics' and/or materialmen's lien holders (or possible lien holders), and in consideration of the benefit
of the Party of the First Part in trie conduct.of its business by reason thereof, Party of the First Part
guarantees and agrees as follows: • ./;,"..
•' V)
'
'5
:V fc
<;

"

' • • • •

. ••

'• • '

•

i* .

\

That if the Party of the Second Part shall omit from such mortgage? an e x c e p t i o n c o n c e r n i n g c
more of.such liens, fil^d or unfiled,,and one or more such mechanics' and/or materialmen's liens, is. lias
been or may thereafter^ be filed or secured, on'the insured pre misjK effective or relating back to a date
prior to the date of theipolicy.'then, upon written demand of the Party of the Second Part..the Party of the
First Part agrees to promptly secure, the discharge of ail such liens.' •;.;
'
. - '

''••

.

' «

In the event Party of the First Part fails to promptly discharge all such liens, then Party of the
Second Part, may pay, compromise, settle or discharge such liens and recover from the Party of the First
Part such amounts so paid.
*:
. *
.:
Party of the First Part agrees upon demand to indemnify Party of the Second Part for any 'J^S
(inducing but not limircd to amounts paid in discharge of the lien,expenses of investigation, preparation
for litigation, judgment, court costs,, and attorney's fees) it may sustain by reason of omitting to set out
such lien (s) as;an exception in the mortgage executed hereunder or by!reason of enforcement:
af t h i s agreement. -.The o b l i g a t i o n of the Party of tho F i r s t Part in this'.agreement
:
s h a l l extend to thermortgage executed by, through, or for the Party of trie F i r s t Part
of assigns on the above premises. .v-'.7?'
' ' V |-.. ••* ."j.
:$''*''*•*
. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto'set their hands-arid seds th«'day ;\nd
year first above written.;. v
»;• ^; - r . •
<'.
IMTERNATION/\L
.Hnte C i t y Morti
,

•; .

;.St3nley ^Tj

Party ufih<,e f-'ifsl l"art
Party of the First Part

*t)

s

...

4

. , s . **

1

v:^

U EXHIBIT
A

V3: 11

Gate City Mortgage Co.
ASSUMPTION AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT made on the date hereinafter set forth opposite the signatures of Vendor
and Purchaser, by and between: Donald Lewis Smith, a married man and Jedd P. Jones,
?...™??S.).?f*..™?.~
an(j

„

hereinafter called Vendors,

!< jj.burri Vac a t .i onI..HOITO_ S.hare, .J.nc..
e

.

,

,

„

_

_

8*?5 W~st S i l v e r Spur

hereinafter called
D

oad

Purchasers, of property located at
—
WHEREAS
.?.?+®..f?.I.t.Y ^rlgage..CO;_
_
is t h e o w n e r a n d
holder of a certain note dated ...1.?~9.?~§J.
executed and delivered by Vendors or cheir predecessors in interest to . ...Gate City...Mortgage..Ccu..
in tho princip.il amount of $ ?.9P.^9.P..\9.Q
...secured by a mortgage executed and delivered by
Vendors or thetr predecessors in interest and recorded in Book M2Q.9.... of
at Page 29-33
in the ...Summit. ..
County Recorder's office, State of
-Utah—
—,
as Document No. .!.?.7.7.?.l
WHEREAS, Vendors represent that all regular required monthly installment payments heretofore due and'owing under the note and mortgage have been paid and that all other obligations
to be performed prior to the date hereof under the terms of the note and mortgage have been
performed, and that the unpaid balance of the loan as of
is %
with interest paid to —
•
WHEREAS. Purchasers have purchased or are now purchasing from Vendors the property
covered by said Mortgage:
NOW, THEREFORE, the said parties, in consideration of '.he premises and of their mutual
promises as herein set forth, do agree as follows:
Purchasers assume and agree to pay said note as therein provided, and further to assume ail
the obligations of said mortgage as therein provided, and to perform in accordance with the covenants and conditions thereof.
It is understood that Mortgagee does not release Vendor or Vendors from further liability
under or on account of the said note and mortgage.
Vendors hereby transfer to Purchasers, subject to the conditions of the mortgage pertaining
to same, ail their right, title and interest in the policy of hazard insurance and in the funds on
deposit in escrow as payment for taxes and hazard insurance premium, and mortgage insurance
premium, in connection with said mortgage.
The word "note" as used herein shall be construed to mean note, bond or other instrument
evidencing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "mortgage" as used herein shall be construed to mean mortgage, deed of trust, or other instrument securing the indebtedness herein referred to. The word "Mortgagor" shall include Trustor, and word "Mortgagee' shall include Beneficiary under a deed of trust.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this instrument has been executed by the parties hereto on the
dates set forth opposite their names.
.-•

Dated

_ <• - -C^T?!< ' ^ ^ ^ f e ? - ? - ^ ^ ? ! . .
Donald Lewis Smith

^tndor

Jedd P. Jones
J<»nes' /

Ve
Vendor

Dated
Purchaser
Purchaser

(over)

r.9in3

